

the bonds of ignorance and superstition, and of their bodies from the arbitrary oppression of the constituted social authorities.^18

But the eighteenth century enlightenment was by no means a *de novo* movement. Really the Second Enlightenment, it had its beginnings in the First Enlightenment or the Renaissance. Hence we move still further back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, encouraged to continue our inquest-in-reverse by Stanley Hopper's *The Crisis of Faith*, a brilliant study of this pivotal epoch in Western history. He reminds us that "The basic assumptions which have given rise to our passion for freedom, for reason, for investigation, for science, for modernity, were projected in that historical upheaval which Machiavelli called a *ritorno al segno* -- a return to the original source of life."^19 In elaborating this thesis, Hopper reminds us, further, that the biblical-Christian-medieval worldview was at the time of the Renaissance subjected to a threefold rift. First, there was "the deliberate turning from the 'other world' to this world and to man in this world, a shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric consciousness. This was a choice both of practical consequences (the relativity of ethics) and of metaphysical implication. Second, there was the discovery of man's allegedly "own infinite capacities. As the world was mystically endowed with indefinite progress and goodness, so man turned toward an unlimited future wherein he might unfold his limitless powers." Third, there "was the accommodation of religious faith to a sort of specious neutrality, a skeptical suspension of decision on ultimate questions; an *attitude* . . . [of] 'nonchalance' toward salvation, a life 'without fear and without repentance.'"^20

What in their outworking were the consequences of this radical "shift in attitude towards man and his place in the cosmos"? In an abridgment of the intellectual background of the modern mind, a *tour de force* which is nothing short of scintillating, Hopper rehearses what followed when man opted to rely on his wisdom and power.

The turning to the autonomous reason resulted in skeptical impotence (Montaigne), in solipsism (Descartes), in subjectivity (Kant), and in tautology (Hegel). In all of which is discernible a pattern of introversion whereby the self turns in upon itself and yearns for egress into truth. Similarly in the experiments in culture, the prophetic utterance of Luther, which brought the individual to his place of dignity before God, was lost by those successive thinkers who wished to preserve the dignity immanently and rationalistically, independently or magically, romantically or eclectically. Thus in *Hamlet* we beheld the Renaissance individual enervated by doubt and overborne by circumstance in a negative determination; in *Faust* this doubt was positively determined toward despair; in its longing for the infinite the soul returned by disillusionment back in upon itself in what has since been called romantic agony; and in the sanity of Matthew Arnold we saw eclectic wisdom compounded with a Stoic pride whereby a reasoned self-sufficiency maintained itself by morals and by resignation. Matthew Arnold (morals and resignation) is the Stoic counterpart at the end of this development of Montaigne's Epicureanism (morals and hedonism) . . . The pattern of the Renaissance turns in upon the self and thus expounds by dialectical unfolding what Luther knew as sin: *cor incurvatum in se* -- the self's refusal to acknowledge its relationship to God.^21

Historically, it would seem, we have thus reached the end of our quest, locating the origins of the modern mind in that praiseworthy rebirth of